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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 3
CASE DIGESTS
EVIDENCE; Circumstantial; Proof of Negligence
Wolstenholm v. Kaliff, 176 Neb. 358, 126 N.W.2d 178 (1964).
Action was brought for the wrongful death of a wife in an
automobile collision. The district court sustained a motion by the
plaintiff for a new trial after the jury had returned a verdict
awarding damages. The defendant appealed from the granting of
the motion. A cross appeal seeking to limit the new trial to the
question of damages was made by the plaintiff. Held: Judg-
ment affirmed as modified. On the question of the submission of
contributory negligence to the jury, the court held that "circum-
stantial evidence sufficient to submit an issue of negligence to a
jury must be such that a reasonable inference arises showing that
the person charged was negligent and that such inference is the
only one that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." Id. at 364-65,
126 N.W.2d at 182. (Emphasis added.) Chief Justice White, who
concurred in the result, did not agree with the rule enunciated as
to the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to make a jury
case.
In Blid v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 89 Neb. 689, 131 N.W. 1027
(1911), the rule was first stated that, when circumstantial evi-
dence is introduced for the purpose of proving negligence, the
issue of negligence may be submitted to the jury provided it is
the only inference that can be drawn from the facts. If any in-
ference other than negligence can reasonably be drawn from
such evidence the issue may not be submitted to the jury. But, in
Davis v. Dennert, 162 Neb. 65, 75 N.W.2d 112 (1956), the court
expressly limited the application of the Blid rule to criminal cases.
Such a rule, the court felt, had no application in civil cases where
it was unnecessary for the proof to exclude all reasonable doubt.
The proper rule for civil cases was to be "'that the facts and
circumstances proved, together with the inferences that may be
legitimately drawn from them, shall indicate, with reasonable
certainty, the negligent act complained of.'" Id. at 74, 75 N.W.2d
at 119. This rule, in contrast with the Blid rule, requires only
that the plaintiff establish his case by the preponderance of the
evidence, and not that he exclude all reasonable doubt.
The courts of other states are divided on whether circumstan-
tial evidence to prove negligence in a civil case must exclude all
reasonable doubt, or whether the preponderance of the evidence
is sufficient. See 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 1189, at 1041 (1939);
32 (a) C.J.S. Evidence § 1039, at 748 (1964).
CASE DIGESTS
The adoption of the Blid rule in the instant case may indicate
an implied overruling of Davis. Until the court chooses to clarify
the issue, however, the standard of proof required remains an
open question.
COMPENSATION; Injury Defined
Campbell v. City of North Platte, 178 Neb. 244, 132 N.W.2d 876
(1965).
Appellant, widow of a fireman, brought an action under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 35-202 (Reissue 1960), which provides a pension for
the widow and minor children of firemen if "death is caused by
or is the result of injuries received while in the line of duty ... .
The deceased had died as a result of coronary arteriosclerosis, a
partial cause of which was shown to be the emotional stress and
strain caused by answering fire and ambulance calls over a period
of fifteen years. Appeal was taken from a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. Held: Judgment reversed. The death was
a "result of injuries while in the line of duty" even though the
heart attack occurred on the deceased's third consecutive day off
duty and fifteen days after his last fire call. Dissent: The
statute was not intended to provide compensation when death
occurred because of coronary artery disease caused by stress and
strain not peculiar to the occupation of a fireman.
This case is an extension of the holding in Elliott v. City of
Omaha, 109 Neb. 478, 191 N.W. 653 (1922), which interpreted the
phrase "where death is caused by or is the result of injuries re-
ceived while in the line of duty" to include disease contracted in
the line of duty (pneumonia in that case). While the Workman's
Compensation Act provides for coverage only from an "accident,"
which is defined therein as an unexpected or unforeseen event
happening suddenly and violently, the word "injury" as used in
the Firemen's Pension Act has been interpreted to include
"any hurtful effect which a fireman may receive in the line of
his duty ... ." Id. at 481, 191 N.W. at 654. This liberal construc-
tion of the statute would certainly include a coronary caused by
the considerable stress to which firemen are subjected. Both the
Elliott and the Campbell decisions illustrate the willingness of
the court to effectuate the apparent legislative intent to provide
broader coverage under the Firemen's Pension Act than under
the Workman's Compensation Act.
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EVIDENCE; Business Records; Computer
Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
Plaintiff insurance company brought an action to recover pre-
miums due on a retrospective insurance contract. Under the terms
of the contract, the earned premiums were calculated retrospec-
tively according to a formula based on the loss experience of the
defendant. Data concerning the defendant's losses were fed into
an electronic computer by the plaintiff and the information was
then stored on magnetic tape for later use by the computer in
calculating the earned premiums. To establish the amount of
premium due, plaintiff introduced into evidence an exhibit con-
sisting of calculations prepared and printed by the electronic
computer from the information stored on the magnetic tape. The
district court received the exhibit into evidence over the defend-
ant's objection as to its foundation. Held: Judgment affirmed.
The information retrieved here by electronic computer from mag-
netic tape was properly admitted into evidence under the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act, section 25-12,109 of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes.
The act provides:
A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, insofar as rele-
vant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation,
and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near
the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of
the court, the sources of information, method, and time of pre-
paration were such as to justify its admission.
The court noted that "the tape record and the information and
calculations thereon were [essentially a bookkeeping record] made
in the usual course of business . . . ." The court further stated:
"No particular mode or form of record is required. The statute
was intended to bring the realities of business and professional
practice into the courtroom and the statute should not be inter-
preted narrowly to destroy its obvious usefulness." 178 Neb. at
259, 132 N.W.2d at 875. This is apparently the first reported deci-
sion in any jurisdiction on the issue. See Freed, "Evidence and
Problems of Proof in a Computerized Society," 63 Modern Uses
of Logic in Law 171, 181 (1963). [After the setting of this case
in page proofs, a Fifth Circuit case has followed the Seib deci-
sion. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Knox Homes Corp., No. 21507, 5th
Cir., April 1, 1965.]
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WILLS; Construction; Venue
Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Graybill, 178 Neb. 81, 132 N.W.
2d 304 (1964).
Testator was the owner of two farms in Nebraska, one in
Custer County and the other in Logan County. Two months prior
to execution of his will, testator had entered into a contract to
sell the Logan County farm. The contract was still executory at
the time of testator's death. The will bequeathed the income from
the farm to testator's widow with the "balance" to plaintiffs.
All of testator's personal property was also bequeathed to his
widow. Plaintiffs brought an original action for declaratory
judgment to obtain a construction of the will, claiming that they
were entitled to the benefits of the executory contract of sale.
Testator's widow contended that the contract was personal prop-
erty, all of which was given to her by the terms of the will.
She also objected to venue of the action in Logan County district
court since the will had previously been admitted to probate in
Custer County. The district court overruled the objection to
venue and entered judgment for plaintiffs. Held: Judgment af-
firmed. On the objection to venue the court ruled that the suit
was a transitory action which may be brought in the county in
which the defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides or
may be summoned as provided in section 25-409 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes. The issue was one of first impression in Ne-
braska and the court noted that "a dearth of cases on this precise
point appears to exist in other jurisdictions." 178 Neb. at 83, 132
N.W.2d at 308. The court recognized two other possibilities for
venue in an original action for construction of a will: (1) the
county in which the will is probated; and (2) the county in which
real estate passed by the will is situated. However, since no
statutory provision specifically fixed the venue of such an action,
the residuary venue provision for transitory actions appearing in
section 25-409 was held controlling.
Although recognizing that a contract of sale is personalty,
the court held that under the circumstances of the case it was the
intention of the testator that his interest in the farm, represented
by the contract, was to pass to plaintiffs. "A general or specific
devise of land passes the interest of the testator in the land
which he had contracted to sell, unless the intent of the testator
as demonstrated by the will and the attendant circumstances is
shown to be otherwise." 178 Neb. at 87, 132 N.W.2d at 309-10.
This holding is an extension of Battey v. Battey, 94 Neb. 729,
144 N.W. 786 (1913), where it was held that a devise of land in
which the testator's only interest was a mortgage would serve to
pass that interest to the devisee.
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CRimInAL LAW; Blood Alcohol Test
State v. Fox, 177 Neb. 238, 128 N.W.2d 576 (1964).
Defendant was charged with unlawfully operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor. At the
time of defendant's arrest a blood sample was taken by a doctor
of his own choice, and the sample was placed in a test
tube which contained a special anticoagulant. Although there
was evidence that the anticoagulant, composed of sodium citrate
and calcium oxylate, was recognized as proper for blood alcohol
tests, there was also testimony to the effect that an incorrect
proportion of the anticoagulant could affect the test results as to
the alcoholic content of defendant's blood. In addition, there was
evidence that the doctor had used an antiseptic "that smelled like
alcohol" to cleanse the defendant's arm before taking the blood
sample. The defendant moved to strike all testimony regarding
the chemical test of his blood and the result of the test on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to allow the test to go
to the jury. The motion was denied by the district court. Held:
Judgment affirmed. The objections urged by the defendant did
not affect the admissibility of the test results but went only to
the weight and credibility thereof.
Construing sections 39-727.01 to 39-727.06 of the Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes, which provide for blood alcohol tests, the court con-
cluded: "There is nothing in the statutes which, either expressly
or inferentially, prohibits the use of an anticoagulant for the pur-
pose of preserving the blood during the interim from withdrawal
until the test." 177 Neb. at 249, 128 N.W.2d at 582. In this re-
spect, the court followed Rimpley v. State, 169 Neb. 171, 98 N.W.
2d 868 (1959), where sodium chloride was used as the anticoagu-
lant. However, the only testimony in Rimpley on the effect of the
anticoagulant was by a laboratory chemist who said that it did not
affect the alcoholic test.
The holding of State v. Fox has subsequently been applied in
a case where the defendant raised similar objections to admission
of the results of a urine alcohol test. State v. Schwade, 177 Neb.
844, 131 N.W.2d 421 (1964).
DiscovERY; Examination of Defendant under Rule 35
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 85 Sup. Ct. 234 (1964).
A diversity suit was brought in federal district court to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained by passengers on a Grey-
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hound bus when it collided with the rear of a semitrailer. The
Greyhound Corporation, Schlagenhauf (driver of the bus), the
owner of the trailer, the owner of the truck tractor, and the
driver of the truck were joined as defendants. Greyhound then
crossclaimed against the owner of the tractor and the owner of the
trailer. The owner of the trailer alleged as a part of its answer
that Schlagenhauf was not mentally or physically capable of
driving a bus at the time of the accident. The owner of the
tractor, in answering, alleged that Schlagenhauf proximately
caused the accident and petitioned the district court for an order
directing Schlagenhauf to submit to examinations by one special-
ist each in internal medicine, ophthalmology, neurology, and psy-
chiatry, suggesting three specialists by name in neurology and two
in each of the other areas from which the court could choose.
The owner of the tractor and the owner of the trailer then
crossclaimed against Greyhound and Schlagenhauf. The district
court then ordered Schlagenhauf to submit to a total of nine men-
tal and physical examinations, one by each of the suggested spe-
cialists, instead of choosing four as the moving party had apparent-
ly intended. Schlagenhauf petitioned the court of appeals for a
writ of mandamus to have the order set aside on the grounds that
(1) Rule 35 was unconstitutional as applied to defendants, (2)
Schlagenhauf's physical and mental condition was not shown to
be in controversy, and (3) good cause for ordering the examina-
tions had not been shown. The court of appeals denied the writ
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held: Defendants may be constitutionally required to sub-
mit to mental or physical examination under Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also said that the
party to be examined need not be adverse to the moving party.
After deciding that the record in the instant case did not make
the required affirmative showing either that Schlagenhauf's men-
tal or physical condition was in controversy or that there was
good cause shown for the examinations ordered, the Court went
on "to formulate the necessary guidelines" to which the federal
district courts are to look in granting motions under Rule 35 in
the future.
The principle which brings the Court's design into focus is
that the moving party must make "an affirmative showing ...
that each condition as to which the examination is sought is
really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists
for ordering each particular examination." 85 Sup. Ct. at 242-43.
(Emphasis added.) What constitutes an "affirmative showing"
will vary with the circumstances of each particular case, but will
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always fall somewhere between fairly certain maximum and min-
imum requirements. The movant will not be required to make
a showing which amounts to proving his case on the merits. On
the other hand, the pleadings alone may constitute a sufficient
affirmative showing where (a) the plaintiff in a negligence action
claims mental or physical injury or (b) a defendant asserts his
mental or physical condition as a defense to a claim. Between
these extremes, there are several procedures which the court may
impose as the circumstances require. An evidentiary hearing may
be held, although it is not required in every case. The movant
may make the necessary affirmative showing by affidavits or by
"other usual means short of a hearing." The Court qualified the
application of the foregoing requirements to the determination of
good cause by cautioning that "what may be good cause for one
type of examination may not be so for another" and by adding
that "the ability of the movant to obtain the desired information
by other means is also relevant." Id. at 243.
It is apparent that the discretion of federal district judges to
determine when to order examinations under Rule 35 has been
left substantially unimpaired by the new "guidelines." The
Court emphasized this by its admonition that "any future allega-
tion that the District Court was in error in applying these guide-
lines to a particular case" will not constitute cause for issuing a
writ of mandamus. Id. at 239. The principal change effected by
the Schlagenhauf holding will probably be to make the judicial
determination a more discriminating one.
Although Rule 35 has been in effect for seventeen years, this
is the first case in which it has been expressly held applicable to
defendants. By its nature, Rule 35 is most frequently invoked in
personal injury suits. In personal injury suits, attention is almost
always focused upon the mental or physical condition of the
plaintiff. But as the Court in Schlagenhauf has now affirmed, the
fact that this has been true historically is not a valid reason for
refusing to give the plain language of Rule 35 its full meaning in
a proper case.
Section 25-1267.40 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes is identi-
cal with Rule 35 (a). The Nebraska Supreme Court has not as yet
been called upon to construe this section, but the same considera-
tions which prompted the Schlagenhauf holding should lead to a
construction of the state statute under which both defendants
and plaintiffs may be subject to physical or mental examination
in proper cases and under adequate safeguards.
